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La Réglementation Des Fonds Spéculatifs/ The Regulation Of Private Equity, Hedge
Funds And State Funds
Revised United States National Report
for the
XVIIIth Congress of the International Academy of Comparative Law
Henry Ordower,1 Professor of Law
Saint Louis University School of Law
United States Reporter
This United States report responds to a questionnaire that the general reporter for the
project prepared. At the time the United States reporter prepared the report for the
Congress, the United States Congress had not acted upon legislative proposals concerning
registration of investment advisers to private funds and derivatives. On July 21, 2010,
the President of the United States signed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act2 into law. This revised report includes reference to that Act
and supersedes the report appearing on the website for the IACL Congress. The general
reporter’s questionnaire is in an appendix to the United States report. For easy reference,
short forms of some recurrent terms in the United States report appear in the following
glossary.
Glossary of Terms in this Report.
“BHC” means Bank Holding Company Act.
“CEA” means the Commodities Exchange Act.
“CFIUS” means Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States.
“CFTC” means the Commodities Futures Trading Commission, the regulatory agency
for commodities, swaps, and derivatives, other than security-based swaps and derivatives.
“Dodd-Frank” means the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Pub. Law 111-203 (July 21, 2010).
“Exchange Act” means the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
“FINRA” means the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, an SRO formed from
consolidating the member regulatory function of the New York Stock Exchange and the
National Association of Securities Dealers in 2007.
1

AB Washington University, MA, JD The University of Chicago. Co-Director, Center for International
and Comparative Law. The reporter thanks Ilene Ordower for her edit of the manuscript and Kim
Hemenway, a Saint Louis University law student, for research assistance and preparation of the initial draft
of the section on sovereign wealth funds.
2
P.L. 111-203 (July 21, 2010) was H.R. 4173. The bill passed the Senate and was sent to the President on
July 15, 2010. The President signed the legislation on July 21, 2010.
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“FRB” means the Federal Reserve Bank.
“IAA” means the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, as amended.
“ICA” means the Investment Company Act of 1940, as amended.
“IMF” means International Monetary Fund.
“IRC” means the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, the United States federal
tax laws.
“IRS” means the Internal Revenue Service, part of the United States Department of the
Treasury that has primary administrative responsibility for interpretation and enforcement
of the IRC.
“IWG” means International Working Group of SWFs.
“SEC” means the Securities Exchange Commission, a federal agency responsible for
interpretation and enforcement of the securities laws of the United States, including the
Exchange Act, the Securities Act, the ICA and the IAA.
“Securities Act” means the Securities Act of 1933, as amended.
“SRO” means a self-regulatory organization established under section 19 of the
Exchange Act.
“SWF” means Sovereign Wealth Fund.
United States Reporter’s Overview.3 In current usage in the United States, the concept
of “hedge fund” is now reasonably settled. A hedge fund is a managed pool of capital
that would be an “investment company,” as ICA §3(a) defines that term, but for the
limited number and wealth characteristics of the owners of the interests in the pool.4 The
ICA regulates most aspects of investment companies’ management and operation. Since
hedge funds resemble but are not investment companies under the ICA, they are not
subject to regulation under that statute. It is this absence of ICA regulation, and
accompanying IAA regulation for the funds’ investment advisers,5 that defines the hedge
fund rather than any set of regulations applicable to the fund.
Following the recent worldwide downturn in the financial services industries, the retreat
of the securities markets, and the massive investor losses from fraud in the form of
3

For a general explanation of U.S. managed hedge funds and their operations and structures, see Henry
Ordower, Demystifying Hedge Funds: A Design Primer, 7 U. CAL. DAVIS BUSINESS L. J. 323 (2007). This
national report relies in part on that article.
4
See discussion infra in text accompanying and following note 41.
5
This report uses the terms investment adviser and manager interchangeably. The IAA uses the term
investment adviser for advisers who must register under the IAA.
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pyramid schemes, especially Bernard Madoff’s pyramid scheme,6 debate in legislatures
and in the media has focused on new protections for investors and the integrity of the
financial markets. Systemic risk, including counterparty risk in derivative products, like
AIG’s credit default swaps, and risk to investors from massive frauds have rallied
legislators and commentators to re-examine the adequacy of existing regulation. A
similar outcry for regulatory change followed the failure of Long Term Capital
Management in 1999,7 yet, as the markets recovered, no material regulatory change
followed in the United States. On this occasion, however, Congress enacted Dodd-Frank
and the President signed it into law. This new legislation addresses systemic risk by
requiring clearing for many derivative products8 and registration for most investment
advisors to hedge and private equity funds.9 It also includes a modicum of investor
protection by requiring safeguarding and auditing of custodial funds.10 This report will
address that debate and the new legislation in the context of additional regulation for
pooled investments, like hedge and private equity funds, which now are only lightly
regulated.
In order to gain insight into the function of hedge funds and private equity funds within
the world of investment capital and investment products, I will contrast hedge funds with
investment companies and distinguish them from similarly unregulated, private equity
funds in terms of liquidity and investment strategies. The report will include a brief
review of securities and investment company regulatory history in the United States to
help place the discussion in perspective.
As a discrete part of the report, I will review the operation and legal treatment of
sovereign wealth funds operating or investing in the United States. That discussion will
concern itself with the possible mixing of political with investment objectives and the
issue of whether or not to tax such funds.
A. Federal Securities and Investment Company Laws for Investor Protection not
Systemic Risk. Following the crash of the United States markets in 1929, the United
States Congress sought to prevent future market failures that injured so many investors.
Congress settled on a strategy that relied on information disclosure. The strategy
assumed that the market would assimilate the publicly disclosed information that the law
would require and disseminate the analysis of the information to enable investors to make

6

Ponzi scheme is the colloquial term for pyramid schemes like the one Bernard Madoff operated. The
operator of a pyramid scheme uses funds contributed by new investors to pay a favorable return on
investment to existing investors. So long as a constant inflow of new investment exceeds the withdrawals
from the artificial investment pool, the scheme works. With the 2008 economic downturn, there were more
requests for withdrawal from the Madoff investment funds than newly invested capital causing the scheme
to collapse. Lack of transparency in private investment funds generally lends itself to such fraudulent
schemes, as no independent governmental agency or SRO is monitoring the actual existence of the fund’s
investment positions.
7
Discussed infra in text accompanying note 33.
8
Titles VII and VIII of Dodd-Frank.
9
Title IV of Dodd-Frank.
10
Section 411 of Dodd-Frank adds section 223 to the IAA.
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informed investment decisions.11 Some years later, Congress developed a more parental
protection system for investors in investment funds.12
1. Disclosure and Investor Protection. The United States securities and investment
company statutes focus on investor protection. The statutes rely primarily on disclosure
to enable investors to control their investment risk by providing them the information
necessary to evaluate a proposed investment with the help of market professionals.
Professional participants in the market assimilate the publicly disclosed information and
make professional and informed recommendations to investors. Sophisticated investors
also may analyze the public information independently to determine whether or not they
wish to make the proffered investment.13 In addition, SROs, including the national
securities exchanges that are subject to regulation under the Exchange Act, have “know
your customer” rules applicable to their broker/dealer participants.14 These “know your
customer” rules should, but do not necessarily, prevent brokers and dealers from selling
inappropriate securities to those customers.15 The “know your customer” rule requires
each broker or dealer to evaluate the public information and determine whether the
security is suitable for the broker’s or dealer’s customers before the broker or dealer
makes a recommendation to the customer to buy the security.16
Unless an exception applicable to a security exists, the issuer of the security must register
the security under section 5 of the Securities Act. The registration statement is a
disclosure document and becomes publicly available. In addition, the Securities Act
requires that the issuer provide each purchaser of the securities from the issuer or an
underwriter a prospectus in advance of the sale of the securities to the investor. The
prospectus must include all material information concerning the issuer and the securities.
Information is material if the purchaser might find the information important in
evaluating an opportunity to purchase the securities. In addition to financial information,
the prospectus includes information concerning the issuer’s business plan, proposed use
of the proceeds from sale of the securities, and information about the issuer’s market and
its managers. There is little expectation, however, that the investor actually reads the
prospectus.17 Rather the registration statement and prospectus place material information
into the public domain where professional market participants, including brokers and
dealers in securities, may assimilate the information and make informed
recommendations to their customers with respect to the proposed investment and its
11

The Securities Act and the Exchange Act.
The ICA and IAA.
13
See additional discussion infra in text accompanying note 17.
14
Exchange Act section 6.
15
Recent manifestations of ―know your customer‖ rules relate marginally to the historical securities law
rules. Financial institutions currently must ―know their customers‖ in the sense of whether those customers
are laundering money or funding terrorist activities.
16
While violation of the ―know your customer‖ rule probably does not provide an independent claim for
relief against a broker, although authorities are split on this issue, it may provide evidence of violation of
the more general antifraud rules of the Exchange Act.
17
Despite the statute, the delivery of the prospectus tends to lag the actual purchase of the securities.
Presumably the reversal of the order gives the purchaser a right of rescission. In view of the function of
disclosure into the public domain and the market professionals’ assimilation of the public information, the
investor has the protection of the efficient capital market hypothesis despite delivery of the prospectus later.
12
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suitability for those customers (subject to the constraints of the “know your customer”
rule the previous paragraph discusses).
Following the sale of securities to the public, the Exchange Act regulates the market for
information concerning issuers and resale of securities. Companies, the shares of which
trade publicly, generally have an obligation to report their financial results annually or
more frequently. In addition, each publicly traded company has an ongoing obligation to
disseminate material information concerning its operations and management that might
influence the value of its publicly traded securities, so that no one possessing the
information may use it to his or her advantage in trading in the issuer’s securities.
Shareholders may not exploit an information advantage they may have because of their
position in the company to buy or sell shares before the information becomes public.18
While the ICA relies on disclosure as well, it and the IAA intervene in substantive ways
to control investor risk more directly than through disclosure. For example, the ICA
prohibits investment advisers and promoters from engaging in transactions with the
investment companies they promote or advise19 and requires investment companies to
place and maintain their assets with independent banks or investment banks.20 Similarly,
the SEC has promulgated a rule under the IAA that prohibits registered investment
advisers or managers from retaining custody of the fund’s assets.21 The ICA also
imposes limitations on composition of the investment company’s board of directors,22
requires an affirmative shareholders’ vote for changes in investment policy, 23 and
prevents investment companies from selling short or employing substantial borrowing
18

Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 that the SEC promulgated under that statute prohibit
any form of market manipulation that results from an informational advantage. Rule 10b-5 reads:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate
as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security.

17 CFR 240.10b-5. See also Rule 10b5-1 applicable specifically to insider trading.
ICA §17(a).
20
ICA §17(f).
21
Rule 206(4)-2 under IAA, 17 CFR 275.206(4)-2. Some commentators believe that the applicability of
that custodial rule to Bernard Madoff’s investment management activities would have prevented him from
operating a Ponzi scheme, but Madoff may not have been acting as an investment manager at all. Rather
Madoff’s investors may have invested in his brokerage firm rather than any pooled fund. Custodial rules
apply to investments in investment companies and not to investments in ownership of a brokerage firm.
IAA section 233, as added by section 411 of Dodd-Frank, requires investment advisers to safeguard and
audit funds under custody but does not separate the custodial from the advising functions as required for
investment companies.
22
ICA §10(a) limits the interested board members to sixty percent of the board.
23
ICA §13.
19
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leverage,24 essentially limiting investment companies to substantially conservative paid,
long positions. The IAA imposes an array of requirements on registered investment
advisers. Among the requirements, are some that seek to prevent unscrupulous
individuals from becoming registered advisers. 25 In addition, except in the case of
qualified clients, the IAA restricts investment advisers from receiving performance fees
that might cause their interests to conflict with those of their clients.26
While disclosure and the various investor protection measures under the ICA create a
comprehensive, if somewhat narrow, system for investor protection, neither securities nor
investment company regulation in the United States addressed systemic risk
comprehensively even though systemic risk, for the moment, has become a grave,
worldwide concern. To the extent that securities laws protect the integrity of the markets,
that protection primarily is for the benefit of the investors in the issue of securities and
not to prevent collateral injury to the enterprise itself, its employees, the community, or
other enterprises. Collateral risks to non-investors have not been a matter for the SEC, as
only investors who buy or sell securities have a claim under those statutes. Some
statutory authority allows the SEC to intervene on a limited basis where systemic risk is
present. For example, the SEC addresses systemic risk through its powers (i) to suspend
trading in specific securities, (ii) to regulate industry participants, including brokers and
dealers, and (iii) to impose various trading rules, such as the rule that outlawed the short
selling of securities that were declining in value.27 Dodd-Frank focuses on systemic risk
by requiring clearing of many derivative positions and recordkeeping for investment
advisers to private funds.
As early as the 1980s, the state Supreme Court of Delaware began to address protection
of constituencies other than shareholders in its corporate takeover decisions.28 Those
decisions suggest that the corporate managers may resist a takeover attempt to protect the
corporate existence, its culture, and its constituencies other than shareholders.29
2. Systemic Risk. Preoccupation with systemic risk is a relatively new phenomenon,
although the Commodities Exchange Act has spoken more directly to systemic risk by
seeking to control counterparty default risk. The trading of commodities futures
contracts30 under the Commodities Exchange Act is in standardized units and uses a fully
24

ICA §§12 and 18.
IAA §203.
26
IAA §205. This report discusses Rule 205-3 and qualified clients and result fees infra in text
accompanying note 80.
27
Until July 2007, an SEC regulation allowed the sale of stock short only when the last trade had been an
up tick in the stock price (or no change following an up tick). Exchange Act Rule 10a-1 (repealed July 5,
2007). Recently, the SEC proposed that it adopt a short selling restriction again in order to limit short
selling in declining markets out of concern that short selling contributed to artificial acceleration of
declines in market values recently. See Release No. 34-5974874, FR 18042 (April 20, 2009).
28
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A. 2d 701 (Del 1983). Delaware is the state of incorporation of the
greatest number of publicly traded US corporations because its corporate laws favor management.
29
Id.
30
Futures contracts create a mutual obligation to deliver and accept delivery of and pay for a quantity of a
commodity at a designated future time and at a contractually designated price. Despite that delivery
requirement, futures contracts settle almost invariably in cash. As the value of the contract fluctuates with
25
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hedged clearinghouse. The clearinghouse minimizes counterparty risk for investors by
acting as the counterparty for all positions. The clearinghouse limits its own counterparty
exposure by marking to market all positions at least daily and accompanying those marks
with margin adjustments – both calls and releases of margin. Dodd-Frank has introduced
a similar clearinghouse system for swaps and other derivative positions. Most swaps and
other derivative products, whether subject to CFTC regulation or SEC regulation become
subject to clearing and maintenance of margin in order to control systemic risk.31 In
addition, new conflict of interest rules will control investor risk and limit parties offering
derivative and swap contracts from investing in a manner that conflicts with their
customers.32 Similarly, as in the commodities markets, automatic suspensions of trading
in the markets fend off possible panic reactions that might cause the market to collapse.
Historically, there was little, if any, discussion of the currently prevalent concern that
some businesses might be too large or important to be permitted to fail because of their
potential impact on the entire market. The collapse of Long Term Capital Management’s
hedge fund group in 1998-9 may have been the harbinger of that preoccupation.33 Long
Term Capital Management was arbitraging very large positions in sovereign debt and
utilizing vast amounts of leverage, so that a very small price movement would yield a
greatly magnified gain or loss. When Russia suspended payments on its sovereign debt
in mid-1998, investors sought to shift their debt positions to sovereign debt of G-7
issuers. Those shifts drove up the price of G-7 debt contrary to Long Term Capital
Management’s investments. While the United States government did not intervene with
financial assistance to protect Long Term Capital Management or its investors, it did
facilitate intervention by the membership of the New York Stock Exchange.
B. Hedge Fund Background: Exemptions from Registration and Regulation,
Structure, Taxation. This section describes common hedge fund structures and
exemptions from registration requirements and accompanying regulation.
1. Hedge Funds and Registration Exemptions. Without regard to the particular
structure of the hedge fund, interests in the fund are securities for purposes of both the
Securities Act and the Exchange Act. Since a manager, who may or may not own an
interest in the fund, controls the fund’s assets and investments, any investors’ profit

and derives from the spot price for the underlying commodity, futures contracts are derivative contracts.
Futures contracts govern physical commodities like grain and various commodities like indices that have
no physical manifestation.
31
Dodd-Frank section725, for example, establishes the registration of derivatives clearing organizations,
and section723 requires the clearing of swaps through one of the derivatives clearing organizations.
32
Dodd-Frank section 732 and 765 requiting the CFTC and SEC to limit cross-ownership of clearing
agencies to prevent conflicts of interest between parties that invest in derivatives and the clearing of
derivatives.
33
See, generally, Hedge Funds, Leverage, and the Lessons of Long-Term Capital Management – Report of
the President's Working Group on Financial Markets, by representatives from the Commission, the
Treasury Department, the Federal Reserve and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (Apr. 1999)
(examining market crisis that failure of LTCM precipitated). Note that in 1979-80, the federal government
guaranteed loans for Chrysler Motor Company to protect the United States automobile industry and its
collateral suppliers.
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results from the efforts of others.34 The expectation that the investor will derive profit
from the efforts of others is the principal identifying characteristic of a security.
While registration of securities is cumbersome and expensive, those concerns may not be
the hedge fund promoter’s chief reasons for avoiding registration. Hedge fund promoters
eschew registration of interests in the funds to prevent the public dissemination of
information concerning the fund -- its positions, strategies, and advisers -- since the
registration statement is a public document. In some cases, registration jeopardizes
incentive fees for hedge fund managers35 and fee generating custodial arrangements for
the fund assets.36 Registration of the fund means registration as an investment company.
The Securities Act exempts from registration distributions of securities that do not
involve a public offering.37 Industry participants refer to this no public offering concept
as the private placement exemption. Underlying the private placement is the
understanding that the investor does not require the protection that public disclosure of
material information and market assimilation of that information provides. The statute
does not define a private placement, but the courts and the SEC have grafted various rules
and tests to distinguish public from private offerings of securities.38
Private placement implies that there will be no general advertising or sales solicitation of
the offering. Identification of prospective purchasers depends upon the existence of some
historical relationship between the issuer or one or more of its representatives and the
prospective purchaser. The relationship enables the issuer to ascertain that the investor is
a suitable prospect for the investment. In SEC v. Ralston Purina,39 the United States
Supreme Court held that investors qualifying as purchasers of private placements must
have (i) the wherewithal to bear the economic loss on failure of the investment, (ii) the
sophistication, either themselves or with the assistance of their own advisers, to
understand the investment and its risks, and (iii) access to the information that a
registration statement would provide.
Despite the private placement exemption, the Exchange Act’s general anti-fraud rules
apply to interests in hedge funds.40 During the initial and continuing offering the issuer
generally must provide private placement investors access to material information
concerning the investment. Prospective investors should have an opportunity to ask
questions of the issuer and its representatives and to receive satisfactory and complete
answers to enable the potential investors to evaluate the investment and its risks. Most
34

Securities Act §2(a)(1) defines ―security‖ broadly. In addressing the question of interests in orange
groves as investment contracts subject to the securities laws, the US Supreme Court approved these indicia
of control and profit from the efforts of others. SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946).
35
IAA §205(a). See discussion infra of exceptions for ―qualified clients‖ that enable registered investment
advisers to receive incentive fees under limited circumstances in text accompanying note 75. Rule 205-3
under the IAA.
36
ICA §17(f) and Rule 206(4)-2 under the IAA.
37
Section 4(2) of the Securities Act.
38
For the SEC’s safe harbor rule, see Regulation D, Rules 501-508, under the Securities Act.
39
346 U.S. 119 (U.S. 1953)
40
See section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 under that statute.
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hedge funds provide their investors a disclosure document in the form of a private
placement memorandum, which standardizes the disclosure and assures the issuer that it
has made necessary disclosures.41
If hedge funds engage primarily in investing in or trading securities, they fall within the
definition of investment company under section 3(a)(1)(A) of the ICA, so that, absent an
exemption, hedge funds must register as investment companies.42 Until 1997, hedge
funds relied on the 100 beneficial owner exemption under section 3(c)(1) of the ICA to
avoid classification as investment companies. If the hedge fund did not have a public
offering of its securities and limited the number of its owners to 100 persons, it was
exempt from the investment company definition and the registration requirement.43 Since
the United States securities laws protect only United States investors, both citizens and
permanent residents, or activities that take place in the United States, non-resident alien
investors and foreign entities did not count toward the 100 owner limitation.
Nevertheless, the 100 United States investor limitation proved to be problematic for
raising capital, as a very large average investment was essential to provide the manager
with a sufficient pool of capital to invest (or so the industry argued successfully to the
United States Congress).
In 1997, the hedge fund industry captured additional investment slots when Congress
added an exemption from the investment company definition for funds that only admitted
very wealthy investors as owners.44 Funds that have as investors only “qualified
purchasers” may have an unlimited number of owners.45 Qualified purchasers are
investors who, in the case of individual investors, have at least $5 million, net of debt, in
investments exclusive of the hedge fund in question.46
The $5 million minimum leaves the investor with significant capital even if the hedge
fund investment becomes worthless. Rarely does a hedge fund, despite employing
significant leverage in its investments, adopt an investment structure that allows the
manager to make mandatory capital calls on the investors.47 Only the investment that the
investor makes or pledges to the fund is at risk for the investor, while the promoter, as
41

Attorneys tend to prepare the private placement memoranda with the assistance of their fund promoter
clients. Stylistically, the memoranda disclose material information in prose that often is difficult to read
and understand.
42
Some hedge funds may invest only in derivative products that are not securities or commodities and free
from regulation in the US. While I am unaware of any fund that has relied on investment solely in
derivative products to avoid classification as an investment company, avoidance of the classification in this
manner was theoretically possible until enactment of Dodd-Frank which classifies derivatives as either
commodities or securities for regulatory purposes.
43
The practical limitation was 99 as most hedge funds were limited partnerships with the promoter as the
general partner occupying one of the beneficial ownership slots.
44
ICA §3(c)(7).
45
Exchange Act §12(g) requires issuers to register and file periodic reports if they have 500 or more
shareholders. In order to avoid registration under the Exchange Act, qualified purchaser funds under ICA
§3(c)(7) must limit their investor number to 498 leaving one slot for the general partner of the hedge fund
partnership.
46
ICA §2(a)(51).
47
On the other hand, private equity funds may have capital calls.
Regulation of Private Equity, Hedge Funds, and Sovereign Wealth Funds
United States of America Report
Professor Henry Ordower, Reporter
Saint Louis University School of Law
18th Congress, International Academy of Comparative Law 2010

Page 10

general partner, the lenders, and the fund’s derivative position counterparties bear the
underlying risk from leverage. If lenders and derivative position counterparties are too
open-handed in their extensions of credit to hedge funds, failure of the hedge funds, as
was the case with Long Term Capital Management and, more recently, AIG on its credit
default swaps, put the lenders and derivative counterparties in financial jeopardy.
By contrast, Lloyds of London utilized an unlimited investment risk model for its
investors. Investors in Lloyd’s insurance pools – referred to as “names” -- received a
relatively high return on their invested capital. If, however, the funds in the insurance
pool proved inadequate to pay claims against the pool, Lloyds could call upon its pool
names to pay the claims without limitation. While historically Lloyds’ business model
was extremely successful and the mystique of becoming a Lloyds’ name was evidence of
one’s status, many Lloyds’ names risked losing their fortunes when some insurance risks
proved less benign than people had thought.48 Environment hazards that Lloyds insured,
such as asbestos, placed names at great economic risk and spurred substantial litigation
against Lloyds under antifraud provisions of the United States and state securities laws.49
Management and Taxation Considerations. Until 1997, United States -based hedge
fund promoters generally located their funds and the management activities of those
funds offshore. Preferred jurisdictions included the Cayman Islands, the British Virgin
Islands, and Bermuda.50 An offshore base was critical to prevent the funds’ trading
income from becoming United States source income.51 Since the fund entities were
foreign corporations for United States tax purposes and engaged in much of their trading
activity for their own account in United States markets, the income remained non-United
States source income only as long as the funds’ principal office was not in the United
States. Holding meetings and conducting other activities in the offshore jurisdiction were
critical to determination of the location of the funds’ principal office.52 The island
jurisdictions offered minimal, if any, taxation, little regulatory oversight (Bermuda
possibly being the exception), English as a primary language, and easy access by air from
New York City for the managers and directors to hold meetings and oversee the
necessary offshore functions.

48

For a theatrical description of the Lloyds’ business model, see David Hare, Amy’s View, Act 3 where
Esme describes her visit to Lloyds in terms of the wood paneled conference room and the real china tea
service. She says nothing about disclosures or her understanding of any risks in the investment that
ultimately causes the loss of most of her capital.
49
See, for example, the litigation website at http://www.uniset.ca/lloyds_cases/lloyds_cases.html.
50
Under the OECD harmful tax competition standard, the principal jurisdictions are tax havens. HARMFUL
TAX COMPETITION: AN EMERGING GLOBAL ISSUE (OECD, 1998).
51
IRC §864(b)(2) provides a special rule that sources income for foreign individuals and corporations from
trading securities and commodities for their own account outside the U.S. However, until an amendment in
1997, that statute would have treated the trading income as U.S. source if the corporation’s principal office
were in the U.S.
52
Treas. reg. §1.864-2(c)(iii) set forth ten functions of a principal office and classified the office as U.S. or
non-U.S. based upon where most of those functions took place. Industry participants colloquially referred
to those functions as the ―ten commandments.‖
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Whether those promoters chose their fund locations originally to facilitate tax avoidance
for their United States investors is doubtful.53 While a small number of United States
investors may have sought to hide their hedge fund income from United States taxation,54
the passive foreign investment company (PFIC) rules made that decision a risky choice.55
Many investors subject to United States taxation preferred to make the election available
under the PFIC rules to include their shares of the income of the foreign corporation
annually, rather than subjecting their eventual gain to the unfavorable PFIC tax regime. 56
Obviously, those seeking to hide income could not make the election.
After the Department of the Treasury adopted the so-called “check-the-box” rule for
entity classification in 1997,57 many managers chose to have the foreign investment funds
with United States taxable investors elect partnership status for tax purposes. Under
United States tax law, partnerships are transparent for tax purposes; the entity pays no
tax, but its owners include their shares of the partnership’s tax items – income, loss,
deduction, and credit – in their separate tax computations as if the partner received that
share from the same source and in the same manner as the partnership did.58 Each
investor receives a statement annually from the fund that shows the investor’s share of
the fund’s tax items59 and reports that share on the investor’s United States federal
income tax return.
53

Recent disclosures show that numerous high net worth U.S. individuals secreted substantial funds in
Swiss bank accounts. David Voreacos and Carlyn Kolker, UBS Clients Await Details of U.S. -Swiss Pact
on Secret Accounts, (http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601102&sid=a9aCm.G382EA). As
their funds were already secretly offshore, those individuals would not need the assistance of hedge funds
to evade U.S. taxes. See, generally, Henry Ordower, The Culture of Tax Avoidance, 55 SAINT LOUIS U. L.
J. (2010 forthcoming).
54
U.S. citizens and permanent residents are subject to U.S. income tax on their worldwide income from all
sources. IRC §61. To the extent that the income becomes subject to tax in another jurisdiction, the U.S.
generally grants a credit or a deduction for the foreign tax the taxpayer pays. IRC §901 provides for the
foreign tax credit.
55
IRC §1291 et seq. defines investment, as opposed to operating, foreign corporations as PFICs and
imposes a tax on distributions and gain from the sale of interests in the foreign corporation attributable to
years other than the year of distribution or sale under the PFIC rules at the maximum rate under U.S. law
and an interest charge on the deferral over the period during which the investor held an interest in the
foreign corporation. Accordingly, some of the income of the foreign corporation that might have been long
term capital gain if the U.S. investors had earned it directly would become ordinary income to the investors
under the PFIC regime. Long term capital gain currently is subject to a maximum rate of tax to U.S.
individuals of 15 percent while ordinary income is subject to a maximum rate of 35 percent.
56
IRC §1295 provides investors in PFICs with a qualified electing fund election that permits them to
preserve the character of the fund’s income, long term capital gain or ordinary income, with the current
inclusion of the income under IRC §1293. Investors may defer inclusion by agreeing to pay interest on the
deferred tax amount.
57
Treas. reg. §301.7701-3 permits many foreign entities to elect classification as partnerships for U.S. tax
purposes. Because of some opportunities to game the U.S. foreign tax credit rules, the ―check-the-box‖
election currently is under siege. President Obama’s tax reform proposals include repeal of the election.
U.S. Department of the Treasury, General Explanations of the Administration's Fiscal Year 2010 Revenue
Proposals 28 (May 11, 2009)(the ―green book‖). See Lee Sheppard, Check-the-Box Repeal Likely to be
Enacted, 124 TAX NOTES 116 (July 13, 2009).
58
IRC §701 et seq.
59
For U.S. partnerships, the statement is a K-1 statement. Since the foreign entity is not subject to U.S.
taxing jurisdiction, it need not file a U.S. tax return, but it makes the necessary computations and reports to
the investors on substitute K-1 forms.
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However, the 1997 change in the principal office rule for sourcing income from securities
trading obviated the need for United States managers to maintain extensive facilities and
operations outside the United States. 60 With the statutory change, a United States
principal office would no longer cause securities trading income to have a United States
source if foreign investors or foreign funds received the income. Operational shift to the
United States without jeopardizing the foreign source for the income that foreign
investors received led to an increasing use of United States limited partnerships for hedge
funds. The change facilitated the migration of many offshore funds with United States
taxable investors to the United States and enabled hedge fund promoters to adopt the now
common master-feeder structures for the hedge fund family. United States investors
would become limited partners in tax transparent, United States hedge fund limited
partnerships. The partnerships would admit only United States qualified purchaser
investors,61 one or more offshore corporate funds, and possibly a United States
partnership fund limited to 100 investors for non-qualified purchasers.62 Since the United
States taxable investors would invest in the United States limited partnership, the
offshore funds no longer needed to elect United States partnership status. Those funds
that invested in the partnership would not be engaged in a trade or business in the United
States because of the source exemption for trading for one’s own account.63 The offshore
fund could admit non-United States investors without limitation free from constraints of
the securities and investment company laws of the United States.
Since the offshore fund was not tax transparent for United States tax purposes, it (or a
separate non-tax transparent offshore fund) would accommodate tax exempt United
States investors, including retirement plans.64 If tax exempt United States investors
joined the United States partnership directly, they would be likely to become subject to
the unrelated business income tax.65 Since most hedge funds use borrowing leverage,
hedge fund income in part is debt financed income. A tax exempt investor’s share of that
income would be debt financed and, therefore, subject to the unrelated business income
tax.66 Absent tax transparency, however, the tax exempt investor derived gain from
appreciation in the value of its interest in the offshore fund and not from the fund’s
income. That appreciation was not debt financed even though the underlying income, if
received as a share of a partnership’s income, would be unrelated business income to the
tax exempt investor.67
60

IRC §864(b). Among the arguments for the change in the sourcing rule was that maintenance of an
offshore office resulted in loss of revenue to the U.S. without creating any kind of useful barrier to the
creation and management of the funds.
61
ICA §2(a)(51) investors with at least $5 million of investments. ICA 3(c)(7) funds.
62
ICA §3(c)(1).
63
IRC §864(b)(2). This is a critical link in the U.S. tax rules because the general partnership rule is that a
partner’s share of the partnership’s income retains the character in the partner’s hands that it would have in
the partnership’s hands. Thus partners in U.S. partnerships, whether general partners or limited partners,
are engaged in the trade or business of the partnership.
64
A U.S. corporation would work as well for tax exempt investors, but a U.S. corporate fund itself would
be subject to U.S. income tax.
65
IRC §511.
66
IRC §514.
67
IRC §702(b).
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The needs of United States tax exempt investors and foreign investors wishing to remain
free from United States regulatory oversight and taxation and possibly taxation in their
home jurisdictions required the continued use of offshore funds. Offshore funds also
enabled United States managers to capture a tax deferral benefit on their own
compensation by using rabbi trusts with the offshore hedge funds.68 To the extent that
the hedge fund transferred the manager’s fees to a trust that remained subject to the
claims of the fund’s creditors,69 the compensation was not taxable to the manager until
withdrawn from the trust.70 The fund would transfer the manager’s incentive fees that
were 10-20 percent of the increase in the value of the fund’s assets rather than the asset
based fees that were one to two percent of the assets in the fund. The fund could claim
no deduction for the compensation until the manager included it in income, but the
foreign and tax exempt investors were indifferent to the deduction, as they were not
taxable in the United States. At the same time, the deduction was not valuable to the
fund itself, as its income was taxable in a low or no tax jurisdiction. In 2006, Congress
sought to curtail this practice by requiring current inclusion of such deferred
compensation in the manager’s income.71 The deferral of compensation income was not
without risk if the fund’s liabilities gave the fund’s creditors a claim to the trust’s assets.
Careful drafting of the terms of the trust could minimize, but not eliminate, the risk.
Hedge fund promoters preferred United States limited partnerships to limited liability
companies, even though limited liability companies are partnerships for United States tax
purposes.72 The limited partnership offered the manager unfettered management control
without interference from the limited partners. Even manager-managed limited liability
companies may have members who are active in the conduct of a business and are
somewhat more vulnerable to intervention from investors than are limited partnerships.73
With a limited partnership, it was simple for the manager to take its incentive fee as a
partnership profit interest that might yield long term capital gain rather than ordinary
compensation income.74
68

Henry Ordower, A Theorem for Compensation Deferral: Doubling Your Blessings By Taking Your
Rabbi Abroad, 47 THE TAX LAWYER 301 (1994) (suggesting the use of offshore rabbi trusts and analyzing
their economics with present value analysis). Compare this deferral structure with the opportunity to
receive compensation as long term capital gain discussed in the text accompanying note 74 infra.
69
A so-called ―rabbi‖ trust as it was a Jewish congregation that first established such a trust for deferred
compensation for its rabbi.
70
Under IRC 83, there was no taxable transfer while the trust’s assets remained subject to the claims of the
hedge fund’s creditors.
71
IRC §409A(b).
72
Under treas. reg. §301.7701-2(c)(1), the default classification for limited liability companies with more
than one member is partnership for tax purposes.
73
In fact, while a limited partner’s interest in an operating, as opposed to an investment, partnership
generates passive activity income and loss for purposes of the passive activity loss limitations under IRC
§469(h)(2), a member’s interest in a limited liability company does not necessary generate passive activity
income and loss when the member materially participates in conducting a business as the cases of Garnett
v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. No. 19 (June 30, 2009) and Thompson v. United States, No. 06-211 T (Fed Cl.
July 20, 2009), recently held.
74
Rev. Proc. 93-27, 1993-2 C.B. 343 (treating the receipt of a profits interest for services as non-taxable
when received, unless certain exceptions rendering valuation simple and straightforward apply, leaving the
partner to receive a distributive share of the partnership’s income). IRC §702(b). There is extensive current
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C. Registered Hedge Funds. Investment advisers to investment companies must
register under the IAA75 and, generally, may not receive any portion of the investment
company’s gains or capital appreciation as a fee.76 This incentive fee prohibition does
not apply to investment advisers who or which are exempt from registration under the
IAA.77 As hedge fund advisers normally receive a result fee of ten to twenty percent of
the fund’s capital appreciation, either as a fee or as a profit participation,78 registration
would be costly to successful managers if it resulted in losing their incentive fees. SEC
rules promulgated first in 1985, and later amended, permit registered advisers to
unregistered qualified purchaser investment funds79 and to “qualified clients” to receive
an incentive fee.80 Investment advisers may contract to charge incentive fees to investors
in registered investment companies with qualified clients, as long as any unqualified
client investor does not pay an incentive fee. These “qualified client” investment
companies largely take the form of hedge funds that invested in other hedge funds, sodiscussion of whether or not to alter U.S. tax rules to treat those profits interests that participants in the
industry refer to as ―carried interests‖ as ordinary income rather than as a share of the partnership’s profit
having the same character as the income has to the partnership – possibly long term capital gain. Current
tax reform proposals would classify the income from carried interests as ordinary income. The green book,
supra note 57 at 23. The most recent proposing pending, but currently stalled, in the U.S. Congress is the
American Jobs and Closing Tax Loopholes Act of 2010, H.R. 4213 (last action June 22, 2010), would add
section 710 to the IRC and tax all or part of income from the carried interest as ordinary rather than capital
for investment service partnerships. See, generally on the issue of service partnerships, Henry Ordower,
Taxing Service Partners to Achieve Horizontal Equity, 46 The Tax Lawyer 19 (1992) (arguing that the
profits interests should be taxable as open transactions) and Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: Taxing
Partnership Profits in Private Equity Funds, 83 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1 (2008) (analyzing various arguments for
taxing a profits interest but concluding that the private equity fund managers should have ordinary income
from their profits interests in the private equity funds). The long term capital gain/compensation issue
affects private equity fund managers somewhat more than hedge fund managers because much hedge fund
income is ordinary income or short term capital gain, taxed under U.S. law as ordinary income to the extent
that it does not offset long or short term capital loss. Some hedge funds trade commodities yielding gain
and loss that is 60 percent long term and 40 percent short term capital under IRC §1256. Private equity
funds often sell large positions in a single corporation that the fund has held for more than a year thereby
yielding substantial long term capital gain.
75
IAA §203(b)(3).
76
IAA §205(a).
77
Hedge fund advisers generally rely on the registration exemption under IAA §203(b)(3) for advisers
having fewer than fifteen clients. In 2006, the SEC sought, albeit unsuccessfully, to extend mandatory
registration under the IAA to many hedge fund managers. IAA Rule 203(b)(3)-2 (invalidated and
withdrawn). In Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006), the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
invalidated the new regulations following the date on which managers first had to register under the
regulations. The revised regulations would have altered the manner in which an investment advisor counts
clients. Managers who previously did not have to register because they had fewer than fifteen clients
would have had to count each investor in a hedge fund — rather than only the fund itself — as a client for
purposes of the fewer than fifteen client rule. Ordower, Demystifying Hedge Funds, supra, note 3 at 4.
78
See discussion of the profit participation supra in note 74 and accompanying text.
79
Funds exempt under ICA §3(c)(7).
80
IAA Rule 205-3. Registered investment advisers may charge incentive or result fees to ―qualified
clients‖ who, in the case of individuals, have at least $1.5 million in assets under the current rule, as
opposed to the $1 million asset threshold for ―accredited investors‖ to whom issuers may sell private
placement securities with no limit on the number of offerees or investors. See Securities Act Reg. D and
Rule 501.
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called “funds of funds.” By investing in other hedge funds, the registered company does
not run afoul of limitations under the ICA on use of financial leverage or short selling, as
those activities would occur only at the level of the funds in which the registered fund
invested and not in the registered fund itself.
This retail product of a registered fund of funds emerged when the SEC permitted the
incentive fees in 1985 but did not capture any significant portion of the investment
company market until later. While I am certain that the number of registered funds of
hedge funds grew steadily after 1998, published statistics do not track those funds
separately.81 A recent government study estimates that there are 1991 registered hedge
fund advisers.82 That number of registered advisers will grow materially under DoddFrank which eliminates the exemption from registration for most advisers to hedge
funds.83 Registration will not affect the advisers’ ability to collect incentive fees.
D. Private Equity Funds Contrasted with Hedge Funds. Hedge funds and private
equity funds often resemble one another structurally. As hedge fund managers employ a
broad range of investment strategies, it is difficult to generalize a description of hedge
fund investing. Hedge funds tend to trade actively, taking both long and short positions.
Hedge funds invest in a diverse portfolio of securities, derivative positions, and,
sometimes, commodities, and seek to maintain relative liquidity so that their investors
may invest and disinvest at regular intervals ranging from monthly to annually.
Illiquidity hinders disinvestment at times, and hedge funds need to create a “side-pocket”
for illiquid positions, so that investors wishing to disinvest may redeem the bulk of their
investment but continue to own an interest in the side-pocket until the fund ultimately
disposes of the illiquid positions. Hedge funds only occasionally acquire a sufficiently
large position to control a company although they may acquire a large position with the
intention of influencing management in order to affect the short term share price and
value of the investment. Influence is not generally the primary objective and hedge funds
may risk violating the antifraud rules of the Exchange Act if their influence constitutes
share price manipulation.
Private equity funds focus their portfolios on one or a few positions for a long term
investment strategy often with the objective to acquire control of their investment targets
in order to capture management. The funds seek to increase the value of the target,
possibly only short term, so that the target will have sufficient resources to pay the
private equity fund’s acquisition indebtedness and provide a substantial return to the
private equity fund investor over a two to five year period.
Once in control, private equity funds tend to alter the structure of their targets by
disposing of assets that the targets do not deploy efficiently and replacing or restructuring
management and the target’s business plan to enhance value – at least in the short term.
81

See, for example, Investment Company Institute, 2009 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACTBOOK, available at
http://www.icifactbook.org/index.html.
82
GAO 09-677T, Hedge Funds: Overview of Regulatory Oversight, Counterparty Risks, and Investment
Challenges (Statement of Orice M. Williams, Director, Financial Markets and Community Investment) 7
(May 7, 2009).
83
Section 403 of Dodd-Frank.
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At the end of the two to five year period investment window, the private equity fund
either will resell the target or syndicate it in a public offering of shares. The fund then
returns its capital to its investors, or, alternatively, invests in another target enterprise
allowing investors who prefer to withdraw their investment in the fund. Accordingly,
private equity fund investments are illiquid, with investors committing their capital for
the full investment window.84 Occasionally, the private equity funds will make provision
for capital calls on the investors, or, alternatively, provide the investors the opportunity to
invest further capital as needed in preference to new investors. If the fund has capital
calls, there is a ceiling amount that the investor must contribute to the fund. An openended commitment like the Lloyds of London model for its names would be exceptional.
The fund adviser uses the same fee structure as a hedge fund adviser – as a general
guideline, two percent annually of the fund’s assets and twenty percent of the increase in
the fund’s value. Private equity funds lend themselves to incentive fees in the form of
partnership profits interests in the private equity fund limited partnership, since the
receipt of the interest itself is not taxable under current law. The partner’s share of the
profits occurs as long term capital gain from the investment at the end of the investment
life. Under current law, the IRC taxes those profits as long term capital gain at a
maximum rate of fifteen percent for individuals, rather than the maximum rate for
ordinary income, including compensation, of thirty-five percent for individuals.85
Private equity funds play a variety of roles in the market. Some acquire failing closely
held businesses at low prices, often with seller financing, and seek to restructure them to
make them profitable. Others resemble venture capital funds; they acquire interests in
nascent businesses with promising managers. Most visible, however has been private
equity funds’ involvement in major corporate takeovers, both friendly and hostile.
In the public arena, tender offers provide the basic structure for corporate takeovers. If
the private equity fund wants to take the target corporation private, eliminating public
shareholders and accompanying reporting requirements under the Exchange Act, the
takeover assumes the shape of a two step acquisition. The first step is a tender offer for a
controlling or greater percentage of the shares of the publicly-traded target corporation.
The second step is a merger or short form merger of the target with an acquisition
corporation to eliminate the minority shareholders who did not tender their shares or
whose shares the tender offeror did not acquire.
The Exchange Act imposes a series of disclosure and procedural requirements on tender
offers to protect shareholders and prevent the tender offeror from gaining an unfair
advantage over the current management.86 The private equity fund may not circumvent
the tender offer rules with market purchases of shares. It may obtain no more than a five
84

Despite commitments, many private equity fund managers will purchase or arrange the purchase of the
interest of an investor who wishes to withdraw from the investment pool.
85
See discussion supra in text accompanying note 74 and proposals to tax the manager’s share of the profit
as ordinary income. The ordinary income rate reverts to 2001 39.6 percent for individuals after 2010 under
the sunset provision in 2001 taxation legislation.
86
Exchange Act §14(d).
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percent interest in the target before it must make public disclosure of its intentions.87
Various rules prevent the tender offeror from pressuring shareholders to accept an offer
before the shareholders have had an opportunity to observe the market reaction to the
offer or management has had an opportunity to respond to the offer. For example, a
tender offer must remain open for twenty days during which shareholders who have
tendered their shares may withdraw their tenders in favor of a competing tender offer or
for any other reason.88 If the offeror increases the price paid for shares, the offeror must
pay the increased price to earlier tendering shareholders.89 And tender offers for less than
all shares of the target must be pro rata to all tendering shareholders.90
Target corporations’ managers have utilized a broad range of defensive tactics to ward
off the potential private equity fund suitor for control of the corporation. Target
corporations have identified other potential bidders for the corporation and offered
favorable terms for purchase of the target’s best assets if the favored bidder’s offer is
unsuccessful.91 Sometimes targets make cash distributions to shareholders and even
incur debt to make distributions, since most private equity funds borrow substantial sums
to buy the target’s shares and then use the target’s liquid assets to repay the acquisition
indebtedness. A target with a great deal of debt or little cash is unattractive.
Considerable litigation has ensued from takeover attempts and corporate resistance to
potential takeovers. Most litigation has been in Delaware state courts because Delaware
is the state of incorporation for many public companies and questions of permissible
takeover defenses and management’s fiduciary duties are matters of state, not federal
law.92
After the acquisition private equity funds take an active role in the conduct and
restructuring of the corporate business. Since most takeovers use leveraged buyout
techniques that impose the acquisition indebtedness on the target corporation, the
takeovers tend to put the target at risk by materially increasing its debt-equity ratio.
When the target enterprise has been unproductive, the private equity fund might sell the
target’s component businesses separately, destroying the target as a continuing venture
where that makes the greatest economic sense. However, if economic maximization for
the owner has an adverse impact on employees and the community, consideration of
those constituencies might require the continued operation of the economically inefficient
business. The Delaware Supreme Court has been receptive to arguments that
management may use corporate resources to defend against a hostile takeover to preserve
the enterprise. Once management has concluded that the corporation will change
87

Exchange Act §13(e).
Exchange Act Rule 14e-1.
89
Exchange Act §14(d)(7).
90
Exchange Act §14(d)(6).
91
American takeover practice has developed a colorful vocabulary for takeover fights. The favored bidder
is a ―white knight,‖ the target’s best assets, the ―crown jewels‖ and so forth.
92
Santa Fe Industries v. Green, 430 US 462 (1977) (holding that there is no federal securities law claim for
claims under corporate law). The cases of Unocal Corporation v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del
1985), Moran v. Household International, Inc., 500 A. 2d 1346 (Del 1985), and Revlon v. MacAndrews &
Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A. 2d 173 (Del 1985), all involve takeover fights and questions of permissible
defenses.
88
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ownership, it may seek only to maximize the sale price for shareholders. Management no
longer may rely on arguments of protecting the corporate enterprise or other
constituencies as justifications for favoring one bidder over another.93
E. Enhanced Regulation: Categorizing and Controlling Risks. For legislators and
regulators who view hedge or private equity funds as significant contributors to the
collapse of the markets in 2008, the question is one of which risks governmental
intervention and regulation should address. The preceding discussion identifies at least
four different categories of parties subject to risk from the activities of hedge and private
equity funds. Each category of parties is subject to multiple risk types – some specific to
the funds, other more general market risks. Diminution and management of each risk
type may require a regulatory configuration different from each other risk type. Among
the parties subject to risk: (1) investors in the fund itself, (2) investor participants in the
markets in which the fund is active but not investing in the fund, (3) parties doing
business with the fund directly, including lenders and derivative counterparties, and (4)
enterprises, including workers, and communities, that become the takeover targets of
private equity funds or in which hedge funds acquire large positions. Further there is the
fundamental systemic risk that the activities of the fund might increase.
1.

Fund Investor Risk.

a.
Investor Characteristics. Assuming that the bulk of investors in hedge
and private equity funds meet the qualified purchaser test, risk to fund investors is not
compelling as a premise for increased regulation under the disclosure/investor-protection
underpinnings of the securities laws. In comparison with open-ended financial risk under
a business model like Lloyds of London,94 the conclusion that hedge or private equity
fund investors need the protections that registration would provide them seems
misplaced. The sum that the investor agrees to invest defines the investor’s exposure,
and a wealthy investor generally makes investments with differing risk/reward profiles,
so a loss of the invested amount is consistent with the investor’s investment goals. Even
when an investor suspects that managers are engaging in illegal or unethical trading and
management practices95 and the investor may have a private cause of action under the
securities law, most investors prefer to withdraw from the fund quietly.
As hedge funds have become retail investment products for investors who have only
moderate assets,96 it makes sense to treat hedge funds as other retail products and have
registration and additional regulation under the Securities Act and ICA. One regulatory
concern might be that promoters or broker/dealers are selling hedge and private equity
fund investments to investors who cannot tolerate the economic risk or require greater
liquidity than either type of fund provides. The two to five year lock-up in private equity
funds is appropriate only for investors not requiring investment liquidity. While hedge
funds, unlike private equity funds, do not lock investors in for extended periods, they
93

Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A. 2d 173, 182 (Del 1985).
This report describes the Lloyds’ business model supra in text accompanying note 49.
95
See discussion infra in text accompanying note 106.
96
See discussion supra in text accompanying note 75.
94
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nevertheless may be too illiquid for investors who need the ready access to their money
that mutual funds generally provide. Hedge funds tend to allow redemptions at thirty to
ninety day intervals but frequently require a lengthy advance notice of the investor’s
intention to redeem. Some of the rules are in place already. If investment marketers sell
to inappropriate investors, they violate the “know your customer” rules that SROs impose
upon market participants.
Congress and the SEC, in exercising its rulemaking authority, have dealt with different
levels of investor protection providing the least protection for qualified purchasers,
greater protection for moderately wealthy investors who have at least $1.5 in assets,97
and, finally, full investment company status and protections, including a prohibition on
incentive fees, for funds that may offer and sell their interests publicly without regard to
the characteristics of the investor.98 With or without registration, interests in all funds are
securities subject to the antifraud provisions of the Exchange Act, so failures of
disclosure give the investor a private right of action and permit the SEC to initiate
enforcement proceedings.99 In addition, specific prohibitions apply to investment
advisers engaging in manipulative practices.100
b.
Conflicts between Investors’ and Managers’ Interests. Unregistered
funds are subject to additional investment risks. Registered investment companies must
mark positions for which market quotations exist to their current market value and the
board of directors, which is at least forty percent independent, determines the value of
other positions in good faith.101 Investment managers of unregistered funds have broader
discretion in their choice of methods of and less oversight over their valuations of fund
assets. This valuation impacts investment, disinvestment, and calculation of the
manager’s fee. Clearing of derivative positions under Dodd-Frank will limit this
discretion by creating a mark to market requirement for derivative positions.
Since the manager generally receives a distribution or an allocation of ten to twenty
percent of the increase in the value of the fund or each investor’s separate account in the
fund, the manager has an incentive to overstate the fund’s value at the fee calculation
intervals. The incentive fee accrues whether or not the fund has converted the gain into
money by disposing of appreciated positions. Actual trades do not limit this valuation
discretion significantly.102 Most hedge funds have more positions for which no market
quotations are available than do registered investment companies. Fund documents do
not require investment managers to return any portion of an accrued incentive fee when
the value of the fund, or the investor’s account, declines. Often the fund documents
prohibit the manager from collecting an incentive fee again until the fund’s value or the
97

IAA Rule 205-3. Hedge fund adviser may charge incentive or result fees to ―qualified clients‖ who, in
the case of individuals, have at least $1.5 million in assets, as opposed to the $1 million asset threshold for
―accredited investors‖ to whom issuers may sell private placement securities with any limit on the number
of offerees or investors. See Securities Act Reg. D and Rule 501.
98
Subject of course to the requirement that the selling broker or dealer know its customer.
99
Exchange Act §10b and rule 10b-5 under that statute.
100
IAA §206.
101
ICA Rule 2a-4.
102
That is, the fee is a function of the unrealized appreciation in the value of the fund.
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investor’s account value exceeds the level at which the fund previously accrued an
incentive fee.103
This fee structure generates perverse incentives for the manager and increases investment
risks for the investors. If a fund has retreated substantially in value from its highest
value, operating the fund is no longer profitable for the manager. The manager will
prefer to return the fund’s capital to the investors, open a new fund, and concentrate
efforts on raising capital and generating profits for the new fund, thereby capturing new
incentive fees. Further, investors tend to withdraw their investment when the fund
rapidly declines in value. The manager has an incentive to encourage those redemptions
and to understate the value of the fund when there are substantial redemptions.
Following the redemptions, the manager may seek new investors and new investments
from previous investors without the burden of the high water mark.104 There has been
some discussion of regulating this practice, at least for registered advisors of “qualified
client” funds by requiring managers to rebate accrued incentive fees when funds lose
substantial value.105
Secrecy of the manager’s portfolio and trading strategy poses additional risk to hedge
fund investors. There is little to prevent the manager investing for the manager’s own
account in advance of the fund’s large purchases or sales.106 Where a manager advises
multiple funds, the manager may favor one fund over another in timing of investments so
that one fund may condition the market for a trade by another fund. While these and
other market conditioning practices violate conflict of interest and ethical standards for
registered investment advisers and may violate antifraud statutes, they are difficult to
detect and sanctions tend to be lax.107 Following recent investigations of the practices,
the SEC and both the National Association of Securities Dealers and the New York Stock
Exchange, which now are part of FINRA, broadened their rules to require additional
disclosure on pricing and valuation and adopted codes of ethics for investment advisers.
Despite new rules and substantial fines in some instances, none of the new rules seem to
have eliminated the practices that have the effect of shifting portions of the investors’
return on investment to the investment advisers.108
c.
Theft and Fraud. If the objective of additional regulation is to protect
even the very wealthy from pyramid schemes, promoter theft of investors’ money, and
other promoter frauds, rules under the Exchange Act antifraud provisions apply now, as
do common law and state statutory fraud laws. The SEC had the power to investigate the
Madoff pyramid for violation of the general antifraud rules, as there were ongoing
purchases and sales of investment units in the form of interests in the fictitious fund or
103

Hedge fund managers refer to that value as a ―high water mark.‖
To the extent that managers engage in this strategy intentionally, it is a fund management variation of
―pump and dump‖.
105
Referred to as a ―claw back.‖
106
One variation of an unethical practice known as ―front-running.‖
107
For a discussion of questionable market practices including front running late trading, market timing,
and manipulative valuation see William A. Birdthistle, Compensating Power: An Analysis of Rents and
Rewards in the Mutual Fund Industry, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1401 (2006).
108
Id. at 1406-7.
104
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Madoff’s brokerage. Those interests are securities under the Exchange Act.109 A
universal rule for independent custody of assets and bonding for employees of the
manager and for the manager might reduce the number of assets thefts even from
qualified purchaser funds.110 Extensions of some other limited protections such as an
independent audit requirement for managed capital are possible added protections.
Dodd-Frank includes a new required for registered advisers to safeguard client
funds and give the SEC rulemaking authority to require verification of assets under
custody.111 The new requirements are much less onerous than a requirement of third
party custody, as required for registered investment companies, and auditing of fund
balances.
It may not only be hedge fund managers who object to new regulations that limit their
flexibility and fees. Wealthy investors may find such regulation unnecessary because
they have the sophistication to negotiate desirable arrangements and fear that regulation
may cost the manager flexibility that might limit the investors’ return.112
2.
Risks for General Market Investors. Many of the same practices that endanger
the value of investments in hedge funds also may affect participants in the financial
markets who are not fund investors adversely. If a manager engages in market
conditioning practices, including front running, market timing, and late trading, the
advantage to the manager operates to the disadvantage to other participants in the
financial markets. The larger the hedge funds over which the manager has trading
control, the greater the manager’s ability to use the fund’s assets, borrowing power, and
influence to capture for the manager or the fund or both advantages in trade execution,
access to desired initial public offering allocations, and broker/dealer favored customer
status. Funds with very large asset bases may engage in large trades or highly leveraged
indirect trades through derivative positions that move the market in one direction or the
other. While the activities of the managers and their hedge funds may not create systemic
risk,113 those activities may diminish the profit or increase the losses of others artificially

109

Exchange Act §10(b) and Exchange Act Rule 10b-5. Exchange Act §3(a)(10) defines the term security
broadly in substantially the same manner as the Securities Act discussed supra in text accompanying note
34.
110
Funds exempt from registration under ICA §3(c)(7). Like the general antifraud provision, Exchange Act
§10(b) and Rule 10b-5, absence of registration does not mean that any legal limitation exists for extending
specific investor protection rules to unregistered funds. However, custodial arrangements are a source of
profit for managers who deal with the fund honestly as well as dishonest managers.
111
Section 411 of Dodd-Frank.
112
Interestingly, there has been considerable discussion and innuendo concerning Madoff clients with
respect to why they did not suspect something was amiss. Part of the speculation has been that some of the
larger clients and referrers knew the returns were consistently too high for the market but figured that
Madoff was engaging in illegal and borderline trading strategies for the benefit of his investors. In addition
to front running, he was using his power to position himself to capture favored executions from his brokers
and to trade after hours.
113
Current proposals of the Obama administration address the systemic risk from hedge funds and the
trading of derivative positions rather than the impact of market conditioning practices on others trading in
the market. Financial Regulatory Reform Proposals, supra note 31, at 43.
Regulation of Private Equity, Hedge Funds, and Sovereign Wealth Funds
United States of America Report
Professor Henry Ordower, Reporter
Saint Louis University School of Law
18th Congress, International Academy of Comparative Law 2010

Page 22

by forcing unexpected or sudden and temporary market movements that the hedge funds
and their managers exploit to generate quick profits.
Greater transparency would make the market experts aware of the specific market
influences of the hedge funds and their managers and better able to assimilate that
information into pricing. Hedge fund portfolio and strategy information might acclimate
the markets to specific manager’s practices and prevent some sudden market movements.
To the extent that regulatory proposals would force greater disclosure from funds and
managers, other market participants would be able to distinguish artificial from actual
events that affect the markets and filter them out of pricing and purchase/sale decisions.
Loss of those advantages to the hedge funds and their managers would likely limit the
profitability of the funds and lower fees for the managers.
New legislation requires greater transparency by requiring unregistered advisors to hedge
funds and private equity firms to register.114 Registration include regular reporting of the
advisors trading activities and the market positions of the funds they advise. The stated
purpose for the registration and reporting is to enable the regulatory agencies to assess if
any of the managers or funds pose general market risk.115 If they do, they may become
subject to enhanced regulation.
3.

Risks for Counterparties and Lenders. Systemic Risks.

a.
Hedge Funds. To the extent that hedge funds utilize substantial
borrowing and financial leverage in their investing activities, they pose an economic risk
to their lenders and counterparties. With respect to borrowing, under rules of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, banks remain subject to certain per borrower lending
limits that prohibit banks from lending more than fifteen percent of their capital to a
single borrower.116 In addition, under the Federal Reserve Bank’s regulations governing
the margin requirements for broker/dealer lending on margin securities,117 the general
limit is fifty percent of value margin requirement and 150 percent for short sales.118 In
addition, banks are subject to a maximum securities lending limit of 100 percent of
value.119 Various exceptions exist for both margin requirements and overall lending
limits. While hedge funds might borrow from other organizations that are not
institutional lenders or broker/dealers – pension and profit sharing plans, charitable
organizations, state and local governments, insurance companies, for examples – and
issue notes to those institutions, lender monitoring of hedge fund’s debt load is critical to
preventing default. Regulated financial institutions must examine customers’ financial
statements before extending credit and would observe the presence of outstanding notes
to other lenders. Nevertheless, a default by a particularly large hedge fund or several
funds might jeopardize the stability of the lending financial institution.
114

Section 403 of Dodd-Frank.
Section 404 of Dodd-Frank.
116
12 C.F.R. §32.3.
117
Federal Reserve Bank Reg. T, 12 CFR §220.
118
Id. 12 CFR §220.12.
119
Reg. U. 12 CFR §221.
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Off balance sheet financing makes it difficult to assess a hedge fund’s debt load and
thereby increases the hazards to lenders and other counterparties. Indebtedness from
financial leverage in the form of various derivative positions is far less transparent than
traditional borrowing activity and short sales. If the size and volume of the derivative
positions is large, default by the hedge fund’s counterparties, as well as default by the
hedge fund itself, may render the hedge fund unable to pay its traditional borrowings.
Only a small adverse movement in the markets may cause an extremely leveraged hedge
fund to default on its derivative positions, as well as its traditional indebtedness, so that
the hedge fund poses a risk to its derivative counterparties. Dodd-Frank will limit some
of the off balance sheet financing by requiring reporting of credit exposure120 and
clearing of derivatives.121
b.
Private Equity Funds. In the context of corporate takeovers, private
equity funds borrow heavily to fund the acquisition of the shares of the target company.
As the acquisition is a leveraged buyout, the private equity fund’s intention is to service
the acquisition indebtedness with the target’s cash flow or proceeds from the sale of
target’s assets. Since the acquisition indebtedness may equal or exceed the historical
value of the target, and, almost invariably exceeds the liquidation value of the target, as
the private equity borrower anticipates that it will be able to improve the target’s
profitability, the margin of error is quite thin. Default is likely. In many instances, the
private equity fund will renegotiate the terms of the indebtedness as the target proves less
profitable than anticipated.122
c.
Systemic Risk. Leverage, whether for the purpose of funding a private
equity fund’s corporate acquisition or a hedge fund’s trading activities, may generate
systemic risk. A borrower’s or derivative counterparty’s default may cause the lender or
counterparty to default on its own obligations. Those defaults may lead to further
defaults of other counterparties and lenders to the original counterparties and lender. A
default in a large credit facility, whether direct lending or derivative, has the potential to
cause a domino effect. Additional systemic risk follows short selling practices. Market
professionals have observed that short selling exerts downward pressure on the value of
the securities. Loss in value of securities may cause holders of long positions to become
unable to meet margin calls on those securities and, ultimately, cause the broker/dealer
margin lender to default on its obligations. Market collapse may follow if sufficient
defaults occur within a short period, as happened in late 2008.
It is difficult to evaluate what role hedge and private equity funds played in the market
events in 2008. They certainly were not the most visible actors but may have been the
least transparent ones. While hedge funds have engaged in a significant volume of
derivative trading, they have not been the only participants in those markets. Banks,
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Section 204(b)(3) of the IAA, as amended by section 404 of Dodd-Frank.
Title VII and VIII of Dodd-Frank.
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See discussion of risks from target restructuring in the text accompanying note 127 infra.
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insurance companies, charitable organizations, pension and profit sharing funds, and
governmental entities all sought to enhance their portfolios with derivative trading.123
Perhaps the most visible derivative event in 2008 was American International Group’s
inability to pay on its credit default swaps. AIG sold many credit default swaps on which
it was not hedged and was unable to meet its obligations. Those swaps resembled AIG’s
core business of risk insurance products, but their volume exceeded normal risk insurance
exposure because the swaps did not require that the counterparty to the swap have any
insurable interest in the reference debtor or debt instrument.124 If hedge funds were
major purchasers of credit default swaps, their participation in that market augmented the
systemic risk. Media reports did not disclose that hedge funds were major AIG
counterparties in the credit default swaps.125
Subprime lending and accompanying mortgage defaults drove the market event in
2008.126 As the economy weakened, those borrowers began to default on their
mortgages. As interest rates rose, adjustable rate mortgages reset their interest rates and
borrowers defaulted. Similarly, governmental entities and other borrowers were unable
to find a market for resetting the interest rate on their auction rate securities and were
required to pay the higher rate that the instruments required in the absence of a market
reset. The market for auction rate securities became illiquid. Those events had little to
do with hedge funds or private equity funds.
4.
Risks to Target Enterprises, Employees, and Communities. Private equity
funds and, in limited cases, hedge funds that acquire large stakes in an enterprise pose
significant risks to those enterprises, their workers, and the communities of which they
are a part. Leveraged acquisitions threaten enterprises by saddling them with
indebtedness that, absent a substantial increase in profitability, will drive the enterprises
into bankruptcy. But like questions of derivative regulation, the issue of the impact of
corporate takeover is not a private equity fund issue.
Whenever there is a leveraged acquisition, the acquirer, whether another corporate
enterprise, an individual, or a private equity fund, seeks to capture the hidden value of the
target by disposing of inefficient features of the enterprise and restructuring the
123

Compare the Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions, Hedge
Funds Oversight Final Report 8 (available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD293.pdf)
(making 6 recommendations for additional regulation but acknowledging that hedge funds were not
significant contributors to the market downturn in 2008).
124
A holder of a bond might purchase a credit default swap to protect against default on the bond or any
lender might buy a swap to protect against default by the borrower. In those instances, the bondholder or
lender has an insurable interest and could buy credit insurance or require the borrower to buy credit
insurance to protect the bondholder or lender. The derivative credit default swap has a reference borrower
or instrument, but the purchaser of the swap need not have any interest in that borrower or instrument to be
entitled to a payment in the event of a default.
125
Mary Williams Walsh, Inquiry Asks Why A.I.G. Paid Banks, THE NEW YORK TIMES B4 (March 27,
2009)
126
Contrary to the implication of the term, subprime lending refers to lending to less creditworthy
individuals than traditional home mortgage borrowers. Generally, subprime loans require substantial fees
and high interest rates.
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remainder of the enterprise to enhance its profitability. In some instances, the acquirer
will sell parts of the enterprise resulting in the loss of employment and exit of that part of
the enterprise from the community. Restructuring may cost jobs in the short run, but, if
successful, may lead to a more efficient, profitable, and expanding enterprise with new
job opportunities. Private equity funds are no more ruthless in breaking up an enterprise
and no less patient in restructuring the enterprise than are other acquirers, although they
may have less commitment to the enterprise and the community than if existing
management acquired the enterprise. Delaware court decisions suggest that management
resist takeovers in order to protect the corporate culture and the community.127
Corporate acquisitions of other major corporations may not depend upon leveraged
acquisitions as much as other acquirers. However, those acquisitions may have more
impact on employment in a community and support for culture in the community than a
private equity fund acquisition. The corporate acquirer has a headquarters elsewhere and
is likely to shift management functions to its existing headquarters to minimize
management redundancies. That shift not only affects local employment but tends to
diminish corporate support for local cultural institutions.128
F. Sovereign Wealth Fund Overview. As state-owned investment vehicles, SWFs are
exempt from taxation in the United States as long as they do not engage in commercial
activity.129 Most SWFs are independent entities with a board of directors and managers
who are not necessarily government officials.130 Excess foreign currency reserves
provide the primary funding for SWFs and stabilize revenues from the sale of
commodities such as oil or natural gas. While SWFs historically invested in traditional
financial instruments like United States Treasury Bonds, fund managers seeking higher
returns and greater diversification turned increasingly to equities. In the wake of a weak
economy, SWFs made large investments in Morgan Stanley, Citigroup, Blackstone,
Carlyle and Merrill Lynch. In 2008, Abu Dhabi Investment Authority invested $7.5
billion in Citigroup, Inc, the China Investment Company invested $5 billion in Morgan
Stanley, and Singapore’s Temasek Holdings invested $6.2 billion in Merrill Lynch & Co.
Inc.131
1.
Principal Concerns. While SWFs have existed since the 1950s without
attracting regulatory interest, they have begun to face scrutiny because they have grown
rapidly in recent years. In 1990, estimates pegged SWFs at approximately $500 billion in
127

Weinberger v. UOP, supra note 28.
In St. Louis, Nestle’s acquisition of Ralston Purina in 2001 and InBev’s acquisition of Anheuser Busch
in 2008 both had significant adverse impacts on the St. Louis community and employment in St. Louis, as
well as diminished support for St. Louis cultural institutions.
129
IRC §892(a). See Victor Fleischer, A Theory of Taxing Sovereign Wealth, 84 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 440 (2009) (arguing that the exemption is unjustified and proposing methods for
taxation).
130
Michael S. Knoll, Taxation and the Competitiveness of Sovereign Wealth Funds: Do Taxes Encourage
Sovereign Wealth Funds to Invest in the United States 3-4 (U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ, Research
Paper No. 08-28, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1291878.
131
Joint Comm. on Taxation, 110th Cong., ECONOMIC AND US INCOME TAX ISSUES RAISED BY SOVEREIGN
WEALTH FUND INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 29
(Comm. Print 2008) (hereafter JCT).
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assets.132 Today, estimates show them controlling some $3.22 trillion in assets.133
According to the IMF, SWFs could reach $6-10 trillion by 2013.134 High oil prices,
financial globalizations, and sustained, large global imbalances all contributed to oil
exporters and Asian countries accumulating substantial foreign assets.135 The size of the
funds has caused policymakers to express concern that SWFs will invest in ways that
cause volatility in markets and disruptions in economies.
Like hedge funds, SWFs tend to be opaque. While there is some information on SWFs,
there is no uniform public disclosure of the assets, strategies, and governance of SWFs.136
Few SWFs publish information on their size, returns, composition of their portfolios,
investment objectives, and proxy voting policies and some countries specifically prohibit
any public disclosure of their SWF activities.137 Lack of transparency makes it difficult
to access the inflow of capital from SWFs. Foreign investors, including governments,
private entities, and individuals, may have owned over $20 trillion of United States assets
in 2007.138 The Joint Committee on Taxation estimated that SWFs accounted for at least
$21.5 billion of that investment, but that estimate may understate SWF investments
substantially.139
More important than the possibility that the size and opaqueness of SWFs may
undermine market stability is the ability of the funds to use their economic power to
pursue political goals. While the funds serve primarily to protect the economic future of
their home countries, political objectives may inform investment decisions. Governments
might exploit the large pools of capital in the funds to secure access to strategic assets,
including natural resources and defense-related technologies, and threaten national
security in the United States.140 Nevertheless, there has been no evidence that SWFs are
politically motivated investors.141
2. New Outlook. Before the 2008 financial crisis, policymakers had expressed concerns
about SWFs. Currently, some policymakers view SWFs as a stabilizing force in the
economy, as SWF investments have provided the necessary liquidity in some sectors.
132

Simon Johnson, The Rise of Sovereign Wealth Funds, 44 FIN. & DEV. 56, (2007), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2007/09/straight.htm.
133
Research and Markets: 2009 Sovereign Wealth Fund Review as they Currently Control an Aggregate
$3.22tn in Assets Under Management, (Reuters Apr 1, 2009), online at
http://www.reuters.com/article/pressRelease/idUS175494+01-Apr-2009+BW20090401(visited July 24,
2009).
134
Mark Allen and Jaime Caruana, eds, Sovereign Wealth Funds – A Work Agenda 6 (IMF Feb 29, 2008),
online at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2008/022908.pdf (visited June 15, 2009).
135
Id. at 4.
136
Id. at 8.
137
Government Accountability Office, Sovereign Wealth Funds: Publicly Available Data on Sizes and
Investments for Some Funds Are Limited, GAO-08-946, 4 (Sept 2008), online at
http://www.gao.gov/news.items/d08946.pdf (visited July 24, 2009).
138
Id. at 5.
139
JCT supra note 2, at 27.
140
Id. at 30. An additional concern is that SWFs may compete unfairly with private actors through
government guarantees of financial commitment. Id. at 31. Those funds would become taxable in the U.S.
if they engage in commercial ventures. IRC §892(a)(2).
141
Id.
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Yet, concern with the lack of transparency lingers. Comprised of 26 IMF member
countries with SWFs, the IWG developed the “Santiago Principles” in October 2008 to
address the lingering concern that SWFs lacked transparency and regulatory oversight.142
The Santiago principles “identify a framework of generally accepted principles and
practices that properly reflect appropriate governance and accountability arrangements as
well as the conduct of investment practices by SWFs on a prudent and sound basis.”143
The IWG members have committed to implementing the Santiago Principles, which
include a commitment to financial objectives and guidelines for better transparency and
disclosure of SWF relationships with the sponsoring government. As implementation is
voluntary, non-compliance carries no sanctions.
3. United States Regulation of SWF Investment. While the United States is open to
foreign investment, laws limit or restrict foreign investments in banking,
communications, transportation, natural resources and energy, agriculture, and defense in
order to protect national security.144 In addition, foreign investors are subject to review
by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS). CFIUS, which
was codified by the Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007 (FINSA),145 is
a committee of the United States government that reviews the national security
implications of foreign investments.146 The CFIUS monitors overseas acquisitions of ten
percent or more of a domestic company’s total ownership. CFIUS has shown particular
interest in transactions where the target United States company has classified contracts
with the United States government or technologies critical to national defense.147 Under
the CFIUS process, investors file a voluntary notice, often even when it appears that the
transaction does not involve a controlling ownership. After notice is received, CFIUS
begins a thirty day National Security Review.148 Following this review, CFIUS may
either allow the transaction to proceed or undertake a second, forty-five day National
Security Investigation.149 CFIUS has approved the vast majority of notified transactions
during the initial thirty-day period but CFIUS has begun to subject a growing number of
transactions to the forty-five-day investigation.150 While CFIUS has rejected few
acquisitions, investor SWFs have abandoned a number of investments because of the
CFIUS process. For example, in 2006, Check Point, an Israeli company, cited the CFIUS
142

See Int’l Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds, Sovereign Wealth Funds: Generally Accepted
Principles and Practices: ―Santiago Principles‖, 28 (Oct. 2008), available at http://www.iwgswf.org/pubs/eng/santiagoprinciples.pdf (listing IWG members). The acronym ―GAPP‖ refers to the
principles.
143
Id. at 4.
144
See Government Accountability Office, Sovereign Wealth Funds: Laws limiting Foreign Investment
Affect Certain U.S. Assets and Agencies Have Various Enforcement Processes, GAO-09-608, 15-16 (May
2009), online at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09608.pdf (visited July 28, 2009), for a list of laws
specifically applying to foreign investors.
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The Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-49, 121 Stat. 246 (codified
at 50 Appx USCA § 2170(k)).
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Richard A. Epstein & Amanda M. Rose, The Regulation of Sovereign Wealth Funds: The Virtues of
Going Slow, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 118 (2009).
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Jamie S. Gorelick, Stephen W. Preston & Jonathan G. Cedarbaum, The CFIUS Review Process: A
Regime in Flux, 2008 A.B.A. INT’L L. SEC. 3.
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50 U.S. C. app. § 2170(b)(1) (2000).
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Id. § 2170(b)(2).
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process as the basis for abandoning a deal to acquire a United States company,
Sourcefire, which produced intrusion detection technology that many United States
government departments in various sensitive contexts utilized.151 For the SWFs which do
not voluntarily give notice to the CFIUS, there is no time limit on the President’s
authority to investigate and reject even a completed SWF acquisition.152
Since the FINSA changes, CFIUS often conditions its approval of SWF investments on
the signing of a mitigation agreement which might stipulate that the SWF remain a
passive shareholder and not seek representation on the target’s board of directors.153 For
example, as a condition to its $7.5 billion investment in Citi, Abu Dhabi’s SWF agreed
“not to own more than a 4.9% stake in Citi, and will have no special rights of ownership
or control and no role in the management or governance of Citi, including no right to
designate a member of the Citi Board of Directors.”154 Recently, SWFs have structured
their investments in United States financial institutions to avoid CFIUS review. In those
instances, the SWFs take no board seats and acquire less than a ten percent interest. The
funds also publicly disclaim any ability to oversee or engage in the management of the
company or business.155
SWFs must abide by the same rules as private pools of capital. SWFs are subject to the
antifraud provisions of the securities laws, the antitrust laws, and state corporate laws. If
SWFs acquire a five percent or greater equity stake in a public company, they must make
disclosures in accordance with the Exchange Act.156 In order to avoid disclosure
requirements pursuant to the Exchange Act, most SWFs acquire less than five percent of
any United States company. State laws protect against those SWFs with a member on the
board. Directors owe a duty of care and loyalty to the company and stockholders which
requires them to make decisions based on the best interests of the company and its
stockholders. State statutes and legal precedents prohibit SWF managers from passing
confidential information that they might gain from their activities on behalf of the fund.
Trading of shares when the SWF possesses non-public information would violate federal
antifraud rules under the securities laws.157
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Appendix to United States of America Report on Hedge Funds, Private Equity Funds,
and Sovereign Wealth Funds
XIIIth Congress of the International Academy of Comparative Law
General Reporter’s Questionnaire

Dear Colleagues,
According to the letter I received from the secretariat, the topic, which we are supposed
to deal with, is entitled
“La réglementation des fonds spéculatifs/ The regulation of private equity, hedge funds
and state funds”
No need to state that the English translation is substantially from the French title.
These are three relatively different subjects among which it will be difficult to find a
common denominator. The most likely common element is to be found in the behaviour
of these funds as shareholder in investee companies (see part 2).
Therefore I propose to open three serious of questions, the first one relating more to the
organisation of these funds, the second more related to their action as shareholders or in
society in general. The SWF are then in a separate class.
1.

Legal issues relating to hedge funds (HF) and private equity funds (PEF).
1.
The existence of a legal regime, whether in regulation or outside regulation could
be mentioned briefly. Analysis of the different regulations relating to hedge funds can i.e.
be found in the recent IOSCO consultation paper.
The question will arise as to the definition of HF or PEF: I would propose that we do not
attempt to draw up a definition, as this has proved impossible by several international
regulatory bodies. Especially for HF, the formula is so elusive and adapts so rapidly to
market circumstances that any definition would run behind the facts. One can refer to
attempts made by i.a. the IOSCO paper mentioned in the attached list.
In the more recent terminology, HF are referred to as “private pools of capital” and I’m
not sure that is a right designation.

2.

If there is regulation specifically applicable to HF and PE funds, please mention
the nature and general features of the regulation, e.g. whether this is public or private
regulation, and in the latter case, if it is followed up in practice, and enforced by some
external body. Most of the HF are registered in some tax heaven: why is this feature
considered important for the application of the regulation in your jurisdiction?
General Reporter’s Questionnaire
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3.

How many of these funds are registered?

4.

As to the general purport, it would be useful to indicate whether the regulation
addresses the manager, or also the fund, as both systems are practised. The main subjects
that are covered in the regulation should also be mentioned, e.g. whether there is
registration of the manager, what are the criteria applicable to it, are there restrictions
with other activities e.g. asset management for other funds that HF.
5.
In the future it is likely that the regulation will be more developed about the
creation of HF and PEF: own funds, gearing ratio’s, conduct of business rules,
information and /or disclosure rules, accounting provisions, rules on manager’s
remuneration.
6.

The – public - distribution of shares in these funds deserves some mention, as in
many states, these funds cannot be offered to the public. In fact they may be offered
indirectly, through Funds of Hedge Funds (FoHF) , through insurance products, or in
other forms. The disclosure and other investor protection rules could be different
depending on the legal structure chosen. Here a few mentions would be useful. What is
the status of this debate about “alternative products,” or “ substitute products”? Some in
the EU consider extending the MiFid1 rules to all investment products: what is your
reaction to this?

7.

Have there been cases of misselling of HFs or FoHFs? Were these decided in
court? Have investors been indemnified?

3.

Except in case of public distribution, it would be useful to have some idea about
the nature of the holders of shares in these HF or PEF: traditionally, it was said that these
were wealthy individuals, but it appears that apart from FoHF, institutional investors
(pension funds, insurance companies, investment funds) are increasingly acquiring shares
in these funds: is the protection regime sufficient, and should regulation contribute to
improve the position of these not always so sophisticated investors.

4.

Where do you stand in this debate about extending the protections to a wider
public that these so-called sophisticated investors? This is not typical for HF but has
caused most concern if HF were involved.
5.
Do investors in HF and PEF have sufficient information, whether on entry or on a
continuous basis? Should this be left entirely to the freedom of contract or should the law
provide for a generic measure. As HF are increasingly placed with a large public but even
without a public issue how should the information system not be adopted? Continuous
information on the evolution of the portfolio is even more important, as investors often
are left in the dark until it is too late.
6.

If in your jurisdiction the managers have to be licensed, what are the conditions
for obtaining the license: a few items might be:

1

Esp. rules on know your customer, suitability, and so on.
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a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.

Fit and proper character of the managers
Rules on conflict of interest
Rules on risk management: these have been considered too weak
Internal rules on valuation: contractual rules or IFRS?
Internal rules on compliance
Internal rules on asset segregation, on due diligence of investee
Is there an internal and /or an external audit
And are these conditions verified by an external body initially upon registration and from
time to time?
Some of these issues are particularly important for PEF: valuation, conflicts of
interest are well known problems. How does your legal system deal with these?

7.

a.
b.
c.
d.

The recent crisis has indicated that HF may be exposed to substantial systemic
risk, and hence that central banks, as systemic and prudential supervisors want to obtain
data about their portfolios and their behaviour in the markets of at least the largest of
these funds:
Do HF and PEF usually inform these authorities about their portfolio, even
if only some time ex post?
Have these authorities access through their prime brokers? And can the
information be aggregated?
Is apart from leverage, the built up of important positions in certain assets
that could trigger significant price movement upon a certain liquidity need, a point of
concern?
Should these funds disclose their portfolios publicly?

8.

What is the position on the remuneration of the HF managers: is there a public
debate in your country and are there proposals to improve on this point?

9.

PEF, and to a lesser extent, HF have been accused to destroy the companies they
invest in: the so-called “locust” phenomenon. Is this a public debate in your country and
have the authorities dealt with it? What answers have been given, or what remedies could
apply? (this could also be dealt with in part 2)

10.

Market abuse by HF is often mentioned: are there cases that have been reported in
your country? Were these specific to HF activity, e.g. related to the volume of their
business in a given market? Is there a policy dealing with rumours?

11.

Clauses about the withdrawal from HF or PEF: how are these structured? How
did they work in the downward markets? Have investors complained about unjust
treatment on exit? What techniques have been used to postpone the exercise of exit
rights?

Part II: the social role of the Hedge funds, Private Equity Funds
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2.1 What has been the role of PEF in your country: there are widely divergent
opinions, the PEF stating themselves that they mainly offer management services, with an
equity investment to maximise their returns.
On the other hand, HF and PEF have been accused of destroying firms through
excessive leverage and appropriation of financial substance. What is the prevailing
opinion on this subject in your jurisdiction?
They also have been accused of destroying employment2: what is the prevailing
opinion in your country.
Have measures been taken to curb these negative consequences, e.g. regulating
closures of plants, or massive lay-offs? What is their effectiveness? Have these aspects
been litigated in court?
Is there any government’s measure that has been taken, or is envisaged on these
topics? Is there voluntary restraint by the PEF themselves? What kind of measures have
they taken: Reducing leverage, duration of investment, etc

2.3 HF and to a more exceptionally PEF have been known for their activist stand
as shareholders, although they are by no means the only ones. Usually they put the board
under pressure so that it would adapt its policies to their views.
How should board react to these attempts? What are the limits for boards to enter
into contact with these activist shareholders?
2.4 What are the techniques used to pursue their position even owning only a
minor block of shares?
Proxy voting
Voting agreements
Alliances with institutional investors
Short sales as an activist instrument
Media alerts
2. 4. Can any of the following be used as techniques to exercise pressure by HF or
PEF
-Right to call the general meeting
-Motion to dismiss the board of directors
- Motion to split-up the company, or to merge it with another
2

From European Venture capital Association:
Investments by European private equity and venture capital firms amounted to €73.8bn in 2007, and
approximately 5,200 European companies received private equity investments. About 85% of these
companies have fewer than 500 employees.
Studies show that between 2000 and 2004 European private
equity and venture capital financed companies created 1 million new jobs, which translates to a compound
annual growth rate of 5.4% per year (eight times the EU25 total employment rate of 0.7%). Between 1997
and 2004, the average employment growth in buyout-financed companies was 2.4%, compared to 30.5%
for venture-backed companies.
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-Motion to close down certain parts of the business, or to sell it off to third parties
(major disposals).
Do these decisions belong to the competence of the general meeting or can the
board of directors take them.
Is the present threshold to call a general meeting widely accepted or are they
criticised.
2.5. Are HF known for gaining support to their ideas
- By using the media: are measures against equity manipulation effectively put in
action? Should public announcements about forthcoming action not be subject to the
same rules as for board announcements see: reg FD)
-Should there not be more transparency about the identity of the owners of voting
rights in general? And about the shareholders in activist funds (concert action)
- Companies generally do not know the names of their shareholders due to the
indirect ownership structures; what measures should be taken to ensure that boards have
the names of their shareholders, and engage in a debate with them. What is being done
about it?
- Important shareholders hide their ownership by the use of derivatives or
complex financial constructions; by entering into equity swaps, contracts for difference
and similar transactions
- By creating secret alliances with other shareholders, or by hiding their own
voting position: what are the techniques usually followed? .
P.M. is there a debate in your jurisdiction about “empty voting” and how do you
think this can be solved.
2.6 What defences can boards use to resist pressure from activist shareholders?
Is there a board neutrality rule, or only in Takeover bids?
Some advise to engage with the activists: defensive action is a last resort: Can
boards communicate with activist shareholders, or should they abstain on the basis of
equal treatment?
2.8. Some actions by minority shareholders are close to greenmail: does this
happen in your country, what is the attitude of the courts and what can be done about it?
What is the liability of directors in giving in to greenmail? Disclosure?

On PEF
2.9. Does your legal system recognise an obligation of the shareholders to act in
the interest of the company, or to can he act in his own selfish interest?
Does a shareholder have to act taking into account the respect for the interest of
other fellow shareholders (fiduciary duty of the control shareholder)?
Part 3 the sovereign wealth funds
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The notion of SWF is somewhat ambiguous: the aspect discussed here refers to
the fact that foreign entities are owned by a foreign state and/or act on the orders of a
foreign state. Some of these may be specific funds, funded out of excess foreign
exchange reserves; other may be longstanding companies with a “public mission”.
The potential detrimental policy influence has been at the centre of the debate, although
the sheer size of their portfolio’s and the lack of transparency may also be mentioned as
points of concern. In case of difficulty, position may be imposed outside the boundaries
of company law, but by e.g. the rules protecting direct foreign investment.
The Subject has now found a new equilibrium due to the financial crisis. The
Santiago rules have also contributed to calming the debate.
Does your country regulate the activity of SWF and in which way?
Are there figures available about the inflow of capital coming from SWF?
Can you briefly describe some cases in which access to SWF have been refused,
indicating the grounds on which this refusal was based.
Have you in your legal order introduced procedures – possibly generally
applicable – that are applied to SWF and ensure openness of their activity.
Have SWF published their policy objectives, whether in general or upon a
specific investment. Do they publish their voting polices, and the way these are
implemented
Do SWF usually delegate a member to the board? Are there special rules
applicable to that member e.g. with respect to secrecy?
Should investee companies include a passage in their annual reports about the
presence of a SWF and its action within the investee company? Or on the way the SWF
has voted
Have there been mechanisms introduced reviewing, or surveilling the activity
deployed by SWF in investee companies?
Bibliography
Hedge Fund consultation paper EU Commission Febr 09
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/docs/hedgefunds/consultation_paper_en
.pdf
Prada,M. Discours,
http://www.amf-france.org/documents/general/7603_1.pdf
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Forthcoming regulation in the EU and in the US(March—April 2009)
On SW : http://www.iwg-swf.org/pubs/gapplist.htm: Santiago principles
On HF: http://www.hfsb.org/: HF standards board

A clearinghouse system for derivative products limits market flexibility, as standardized
contracts and quantities do not necessarily fulfil the needs of participants in those
markets. In the late 1990s, the IASD created a standardized contract for derivatives.
Users of the standard contract tended to modify it terms so substantially through the
contract schedules that the standard form was left only as a skeleton to provide some
inconsequential boilerplate language and to remind uses or of the types of terms that they
needed. For simple derivatives like a fixed to floating interest rate or currency to
currency swap that have straightforward business uses, standardization and a
clearinghouse might work well, but standardization will eliminate many complex
products. As a policy matter, those complex structures may be undesirable so that loss of
them might not be so bad.
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